2013 Decisions

Opinions of the United
States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit

3-25-2013

Francisco Medina Valdez v. Attorney General United States

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2013

Recommended Citation
"Francisco Medina Valdez v. Attorney General United States" (2013). 2013 Decisions. 1088.
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2013/1088

This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in 2013 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law
Digital Repository.

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 12-3783
___________
FRANCISCO MEDINA VALDEZ,
Petitioner
v.
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondent
____________________________________
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
(Agency No. A030-106-192)
Immigration Judge: Honorable Margaret R. Reichenberg
____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
March 22, 2013
Before: FUENTES, VANASKIE and VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: March 25, 2013)
___________
OPINION
___________
PER CURIAM
Francisco Medina Valdez is a native and citizen of the Dominican Republic who
was admitted to the United States as a lawful permanent resident in November 1970.
Over the course of the next forty years, he sustained convictions for the following
offenses: (1) on November 5, 1986, second degree assault in violation of New York Penal

Law § 120.05; (2) on January 27, 1988, possession of a controlled substance (cocaine) in
violation of 21 U.S.C. § 3147; (3) on February 22, 1991, attempted criminal possession
of stolen property in violation of New York Penal Law §§ 110 and 165.50; and (4) on
September 17, 2010, making a false statement on a passport application in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 1542.
In June 2011, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) issued a Notice to
Appear charging Medina with removal under: (1) 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii), as an
alien convicted of two crimes involving moral turpitude (CIMT) not arising out of a
single scheme of criminal misconduct; (2) 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i), as an alien
convicted of a violation of a law relating to a controlled substance; and (3) 8 U.S.C.
§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), as an alien convicted of a crime of violence, which is an aggravated
felony, see 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F). During the August 2011 calendar hearing, Medina
admitted the factual allegations in the Notice to Appear, and conceded the first two
removal charges. He denied only the aggravated felony charge, arguing that the Illegal
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Relief Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), which reduced, from
five years to one, the minimum term of imprisonment necessary for a crime of violence to
qualify as an aggravated felony, should not apply retroactively to his 1986 assault
conviction, for which he was sentenced to one year in prison.
DHS subsequently lodged an additional charge of removal against Medina,
alleging that he was an alien convicted of an aggravated felony theft offense based on his
1991 conviction. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii); 1101(a)(43)(G). Medina applied
for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against
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Torture (CAT), claiming that he would be persecuted if forced to return to the Dominican
Republic because: (1) a neighbor with whom Medina was feuding threatened to contact a
sergeant in their home country to have Medina killed; and (2) the police in the Dominican
Republic persecute criminal deportees. He also sought cancellation of removal under 8
U.S.C. § 1229b(a), and a waiver of inadmissibility under former § 1182(c).
Following a hearing, the Immigration Judge (IJ) found that DHS had proved its
charges against Medina; that he was ineligible for asylum or withholding of removal
because his convictions for assault and theft are “particularly serious crime[s],” see 8
U.S.C. §§ 1158(b)(2)(A)(ii), 1231(b)(3)(B)(ii) & (b)(3)(B) (last paragraph); that he failed
to meet his burden of showing eligibility for deferral of removal under the CAT because
the evidence did not suggest a likelihood of torture, see 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2); that his
2010 conviction for passport fraud renders him ineligible for relief under former
§ 1182(c), see 8 C.F.R. § 1212.3(h)(3); and that he is not eligible for cancellation of
removal because he was convicted of aggravated felonies in 1986 and 1991, see 8 U.S.C.
§§ 1229b(a)(3), 1101(a)(43)(F), (G). Upon administrative review, the BIA affirmed the
IJ‟s decision and dismissed the appeal. This pro se petition for review followed.
Medina‟s primary argument on appeal is that the BIA erred in determining that he
failed to demonstrate eligibility for relief under the CAT.1 To be eligible for such relief,
Medina was required to show that it is more likely than not that he would be tortured if
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To the extent that Medina argues that the BIA erred in making an adverse credibility
determination, in requiring corroborating evidence, and in relying on the “specific intent
doctrine,” (Br. 11-15), we note that the BIA‟s decision does not make reference to any of
these considerations.
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removed to the Dominican Republic. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2). “Torture” consists
of the intentional infliction of “severe pain or suffering . . . by or at the instigation of or
with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official
capacity.” 8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(1). At his removal hearing, Medina testified that his
neighbor, Mr. Perez, accused him of telling Mr. Perez‟s wife that he had been unfaithful,
and threatened to contact a relative who is a sergeant in the Dominican Republic to have
Medina killed. Medina further testified that he is likely to be singled out for torture
because of his status as a criminal deportee.
The BIA correctly concluded that Medina failed to demonstrate that he was
eligible for CAT relief.2 As the BIA explained, Medina‟s fears concerning Mr. Perez‟s
relative are insufficient to demonstrate a likelihood of torture; Mr. Perez made the threat
only once in the heat of an argument, and Medina did not provide the agency with any
evidence verifying the identity of the alleged relative. With respect to Medina‟s fear that
he would be tortured because of his status as a criminal deportee, we note that the country
conditions evidence does not indicate that the Dominican government targets deportees
for torture.
Medina also argues that the BIA erred in deeming him ineligible for cancellation

2

We have jurisdiction to review the application of the law governing CAT protection to
the undisputed facts. Cf. Silva–Rengifo v. Att‟y Gen., 473 F.3d 58, 63 (3d Cir. 2007)
(citing Kamara v. Att‟y Gen., 420 F.3d 202, 211 (3d Cir. 2005), for the proposition that
the “jurisdictional grant regarding appeals by aggravated felons extends not just to legal
determinations but also to application of law to facts”).
4

of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a) on the ground that he had been convicted of two
“aggravated felon[ies],” as that term is defined in 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(43)(F) and (G),
because those definitions, which he claims were amended by the IIRIRA in 1996, cannot
be applied retroactively to crimes committed beforehand.3 This argument is, however,
foreclosed by our decision in Biskupski v. Att‟y Gen., 503 F.3d 274, 278 (3d Cir. 2007)
(explaining that “Congress expressly mandated that the changes made to the term
„aggravated felony‟ in 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)” applied to crimes committed before the
enactment of IIRIRA).4
Medina does not meaningfully challenge any other aspect of the BIA‟s decision on
appeal. Accordingly, we will deny the petition for review.
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Although we generally lack jurisdiction to review final orders of removal against an
alien removable as an aggravated felon, we retain jurisdiction to review questions of law.
8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D). Whether a statute has retroactive application and issues of
statutory construction are questions of law over which we exercise plenary review. See
Park v. Att‟y Gen., 472 F.3d 66, 70-71 (3d Cir. 2006).
4

To the extent that Medina purports to challenge the BIA‟s determination that he was
ineligible for asylum and withholding of removal because he had been convicted of a
“particularly serious crime,” see 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(b)(2)(A)(ii) & (b)(2)(B)(i);
§§ 1231(b)(3)(B)(ii) & (b)(3)(B) (last paragraph), we note that he failed to present this
argument to the BIA. Therefore, we lack jurisdiction to review it. See 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252(d)(1).
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